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Introduction
What can monopsony explain of the gender wage di¤erential? Which is the relative importance of market forces and institutions in determining the wage di¤erential? Is Italy an interesting case to study these issues? This paper tries to answer above questions by directly looking at the static and dynamic empirical implications of a standard monopsony-search model on administrative data. Actually, there are many reasons for the monopsony model to explain the gender wage di¤erential. In a labour market with information frictions, …rms can (third degree) wage discriminate and pay lower wages to the group of workers that has lower elasticity of labour supply. 1 Of course this requires two conditions to be met. First, it is necessary to provide an empirical estimate of labour supply elasticity that shows that …rms can e¤ectively exploit their monopsony power in setting wages. Second, and most important for this study, which is the role of such theoretical models in labour markets (as Italy) characterised by centralised bargaining agreements and strong union power? To accomplish this task, I offer some evidence showing women have slightly lower labour supply elasticities and wage discriminating …rms can pay lower wages to them. I also exploit some institutional changes in wage bargaining structure at the beginning of the 1990s as an experiment to test the importance of the monopsony model against other competing theories to explain gender di¤erentials.
The literature on gender wage di¤erentials is huge. 2 Most of the studies highlight the importance of productivity di¤erentials and discrimination as potential explanations for the wage gap. However, there are very few papers explicitly looking at gender di¤erentials in a monopsony-search perspective. This is somewhat surprising, in fact these models postulate di¤erences in search behaviour, something one would expect when looking at the data. However, there are a few relevant exceptions. Green et al. (1996) and Manning (1996) provide …rst pioneering examples of applications to test the relevance of the predictions of the monopsony model. The former paper studies the importance of monopsony to explain the employer-size wage e¤ect and to test the model against other competing explanations of the positive relationship between employer size and wages. The latter, using the introduction of the Equal Pay Act in Britain in the 1970s as an experiment to test theories of wage determination, highlights the relative role played by imperfect competition to explain patterns in relative wage and relative em-1 I refer to labour elasticity to the individual …rm, and not to the market as a whole. The latter is usually estimated somewhat higher for women. For Italy, Aaberge et al. (1999) con…rm this result. 2 Recent surveys by Altonji and Blank (1999) discuss in detail the literature. Boeri et al. (2005) give an overview of the main stylised facts in the labour market with focus on gender issues and policy debates. 2 ployment. He actually …nds that after the legislated increase in wages for women, there was no substantial decrease in employment, contrary to what is predicted by standard competitive models. Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999) use matched employeremployee data from Norway to provide a measure of labour supply elasticity to the individual …rm. Using the dynamic version of the monopsony model, they show that male turnover is more wage-elastic than female turnover, as predicted by the monopsony model. 3 In general, most of the renewed interest in this approach is inspired by in ‡u-ential contributions by Card and Krueger (1995) on the employment e¤ects of the minimum wage and, more recently, by Manning (2003) . These contributions point out that some stylised facts and policy interventions in the labour market can be properly interpreted and understood if one is ready to abandon the framework of the purely competitive model of wage and employment determination. By using both UK and US data, Manning (2003) shows the importance of monopsony to understand classic stylised facts in the labour market as gender di¤erentials, industry and size di¤erentials, tenure and experience e¤ects and discrimination. He also discusses in detail how competing theories can explain the same facts, and in which respects the monopsony model is to be preferred as a likely explanation. 4 Most studies are referred to the US and the UK, typical examples of decentralised wage setting labour markets. This paper tries to …ll a little gap in the literature by considering …rst order predictions of the monopsony-search model using Italian labour market data, where wage bargaining agreements are centralised with strong union presence with no space left for employers'wage policies (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). To the best of my knowledge this is one of the few attempts in this direction. In particular, I estimate the labour supply elasticity facing a single …rm using di¤erent empirical speci…cations. This should give a measure of the importance of imperfect competition in the labour market and of the distance of wages from marginal productivity. I expect to …nd some di¤erences between men and women for a couple of reasons. These are mirrored in behavioural parameters of search and monopsony models. Just to mention a few: higher turnover for women implies they invest less in the labour market, decreasing the arrival rate of o¤ers and increasing the job destruction rate and consequently increasing the exploitation rate. Also, if …rms have monopsony power in setting wages, by compressing the wage distribution, they reduce incentives to search for better jobs, decreasing upward mobility. Finally, women can have some comparative advantage in homework, increasing their productivity and limiting their chances in the labour market.
The empirical section of the paper uses INPS Italian Administrative Data for the period 1985-1996 on young workers employed in the private sector. It is divided in three parts, each tries to recover an estimate of labour supply elasticity for men and women to identify the importance of monopsony power of …rms. In general, the estimated coe¢ cients are di¤erent for women and for men, and wages are far from the perfectly competitive benchmark; however, alternative methods provides slightly di¤erent quantitative results. The …rst method uses standard regression function to look at the employer size-wage e¤ect for both groups of workers; the positive relationship between wages and employment is interpreted as a labour supply curve to the individual …rm (Manning, 2003) . Employer size e¤ects by sector of activity indicate that larger e¤ects for women are found in less unionised sectors, where bargaining agreements give employers the possibility of two stage wage determination. This is in line with the monopsony model. Then, I use the theoretical dynamic monopsony-search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to estimate labour supply elasticities using the wage elasticity of separations and recruits. Using steady state theoretical conditions that relate the two elasticities, I can recover an estimate of the parameters of interest; with very low values of the elasticity of labour supply, especially for women. Finally in the last section, I use relative employment e¤ects from a "natural" experiment to discriminate between the monopsony and alternative models. I use institutional changes in wage indexation mechanism at work in Italy (Scala Mobile) to look at the relationship between relative changes in male/female employment and relative changes in the gender wage di¤erential. 5 Actually, I …nd that relative male employment responded positively to the relative increase in the wage di¤erential, although the statistical signi…cance of the exercise is not good enough for inference.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I present the theoretical model of monopsony, both in its static pure version and in the dynamic one. Then, in Section 3, I look at the empirical implications of this model using various techniques. Conclusions are in Section 4.
Theoretical Framework
In this section, I present two very simple versions of the standard monopsony model, one is static, the other is dynamic. The standard textbook model of monopsony serves the purposes of illustration and doesn't aim at being realistic. However, it provides some important insights about the dynamic modern version provided by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) discussed in next subsection. In that framework, the labour market is characterised as an environment in which workers search for jobs and …rms post wage o¤ers. Because of important information frictions, when posting wages, …rms exert some monopsony power under a binding equal pro…t condition. High paying …rms reduce quit rates and increase their labour force but make less pro…ts per worker; on the other hand, low paying …rms loose their workers because of quitting, but make more pro…ts out of each worker they employ. The model features an equilibrium distribution of wage o¤ers and has important empirically testable implications. Before analysing the modern version of the model, following Manning (2003) , I brie ‡y present the textbook model of monopsony.
Static Model of Monopsony
Suppose in the labour market there is only one single …rm that pays a wage w to all workers. Let L(w) denote the labour supply curve to the …rm and w(L) its inverse. Given a level of employment L, total labour costs are w(L)L, and revenue function is Y (L) where the price of output is normalised to 1. The …rm maximizes pro…ts optimally choosing the level of employment L
The …rst order condition states that marginal revenues equal marginal costs
Given …rms have some market power in setting wages, workers are paid less then their marginal product and there is a mark-up between the marginal product and the wage. Rearranging equation (2) and using the de…nition of elasticity of labour supply " Lw = wL 0 (w)=L(w), it is possible to obtain a measure of exploitation of workers " = " wL based on the elasticity of labour supply to the …rm. It reads as
where the gap between the marginal revenue product and the wage depends negatively on the elasticity of labour supply facing the …rm. Benchmark case is given by a perfectly competitive labour market (" Lw = 1 and " = 0) where the gap is zero and the wage equals marginal product. Viceversa, for very low values of the elasticity, the exploitation rate goes to in…nity. The working hypothesis in this paper is that the labour supply elasticity is positive but low and quite far from the competitive benchmark. The whole analysis can be summarised in Figure 1 . The graph shows that employment is determined where marginal product is equal to the marginal cost of labour, with lower equilibrium wage and lower employment than the competitive outcome. 6 
Dynamic Search Model of Oligopsony
The dynamic general equilibrium model of monopsony presented in this subsection is Burdett and Mortensen (1998) . 7 Workers are identical and there is a mass M of them, U denotes the number of unemployed. There is also a continuum of …rms that use labour as only factor of production. The value of leisure is b, common to all workers. Let p denote the productivity of workers. When employed, workers earn a wage w; facing an exogenous probability of arrival of new job o¤ers and 6 In this paper I don't consider the di¤erence between short and long-run elasticities. Note also that, as Boal and Ransom (1997) highlight, the exploitation rate is not necessarily measuring the distance of wages from the competitive equilibrium, but the distance from worker's marginal product of labour. 
where s(w t ) and R(w t ) are separation rate and recruitment ‡ow. In a steady state, with constant level of employment L, the ‡ow of separations is equal to the ‡ow of recruits, so that
Taking logs and di¤erentiating, we get
where the elasticity of the labour supply curve facing the …rm is equal to the di¤erence between the elasticity of recruits and separations to the wage paid. Separation and recruitment rates are given by
where the …rst term includes recruits from unemployment and the second recruits from other …rms. Di¤erentiating both separation and recruitment functions with respect to the wage, we get
Then, write the elasticity of separations
where the steady state condition s(w) = R(w)=L(w) is used. Using the latter condition and equations (7) and (8), the equilibrium ‡ow condition reads as
Given …rms paying the lowest wages will not attract any worker, their size, L, is given by
Unemployment is obtained by imposing (M U ) = U . Inserting the de…nition of unemployment in equation (10) we obtain
where k = = is a summary measure of labour market frictions. As in the static model presented above, equilibrium pro…ts are given by = (p w(L))L for all …rms.
The model above has some directly testable empirical implications. The …rst is the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Green et al., 1996) In equilibrium the employer size-wage effect is, given …rm size, increasing in the equilibrium level of pro…ts.
This says that, if there is an employer-size wage e¤ect, the latter is increasing in the level of pro…ts. These are higher where monopsony is higher. So, it is important to identify segments of the labour market where pro…ts (and monopsony) are higher. These are identi…ed by the second proposition:
Proposition 2 (Green et al., 1996) 1) If unions reduce pro…ts, the employersize wage e¤ect is weaker in the union sector. 2) If …rms set wages, for a given employer size, the elasticity of wages with respect to …rm size " wL is decreasing in k = = if k > 1 and increasing if k < 1:
The intuition for the above proposition is the following: if unions increase wages, the di¤erence between p and w is reduced; given the lowest o¤ered wage is the reservation wage, equilibrium pro…ts are given by (p b)L, so a change in the level of frictions has an e¤ect on L, i.e., the size of the smallest …rm. This e¤ect is negative because higher k allows workers to climb the wage ladder quickly, reducing the size of the smallest …rm. The second part of the proposition calls for identi…cation of groups of workers that have di¤erent k 0 s. Men and women are natural candidates for this test. The fact that k > 1 has strong support in the literature. 8 
Estimating the Labour Supply Elasticity
In this section, I follow Manning (2003) and discuss how one can interpret standard empirical stylised facts on gender and …rm size di¤erentials as evidence in favor of the monopsonistic model against other competing models, with particular attention to rent sharing, unobserved worker quality and compensating wage di¤erentials. I estimate regressions separately for men and women. In fact, there are many reasons for these di¤erential outcomes between men and women. The monopsony and equilibrium search models with frictions have some empirical predictions to expect the elasticity of labor supply for women to be smaller. Some possible explanations for di¤erent turnover behaviour of men and women are in di¤erent levels of search frictions they face (Barth and Dale-Olsen, 1999) .
The level of labour market frictions (summarised by low arrival rates of offers and high job destruction rate ) is expected to be di¤erent for a couple of reasons. Labour market history of men, in terms of wages, promotions, mobility, and unemployment has bigger impact on women than the other way around. For this reason, women should have higher job destruction rates. Domestic responsibilities within the household. In particular, child rearing has a major impact on women's career; again, the job destruction rate should be higher. What is more, market mechanisms can determine di¤erent outcomes. Higher turnover for women implies they invest less in the labour market and choose sectors and occupations in which turnover gains are lower; this reduces the arrival rate of o¤ers. If …rms have monopsony power in setting wages and they compress the wage distribution for them, lower dispersion reduces incentive to search and then reduces arrival rate of o¤ers. Finally, women can have some comparative advantage in homework, increasing their productivity and limiting their chances in the labour market; again, this reduces the arrival rate of o¤ers. Above intuition suggest that I should …nd a larger size e¤ect " wL for women as their mobility decision are more constrained, increasing the level of frictions and contributing to reduce the labour supply elasticity to the individual …rm " Lw for women.
The empirical strategy has three parts. First, I look at the employer sizewage e¤ect and interpret this as a labour supply curve to the individual …rm; I also use reverse regressions to identify the elasticity of labour supply. Second, I use a dynamic version of the monopsony model to estimate wage elasticities of separations and recruits to identify the labour supply elasticity to the individual …rm. Third, I use some institutional changes in a wage indexation mechanism a "natural" experiment to test the relative importance of monopsony against the labour demand theory (competitive or the right-to-manage union model). 9 
Data
The data used in this study is from the Italian Administrative Social Security Archive (INPS). 10 Detailed information about labour market histories of workers employed in the private sector is available for the period 1985-1996. Demographic characteristics of workers are matched with relevant information about the …rm they are currently working at, as sector of activity, average number of employees and age of …rm. Given the longitudinal structure of the data, it is possible to track the entire career of workers and easily construct the variables object of study.
The compensation measure is yearly wages. 11 From the dataset, I extract a subsample of workers that entered the labour market between 1985 and 1995. I use a sample of very young workers working full time (younger than 25 at entry). In Table 1 , I report descriptive statistics for the sample used in the estimation. First, note that women's wages are about 10% lower than the ones for men. The sample is composed by quite young workers, average age is about 24 years for both men and women. The two groups show interesting di¤erences in the amount of experience and tenure accumulated, with men having higher experience and women having higher tenure. The distribution of workers across …rm size in not very di¤erent, but it is interesting to note women are much more concentrated in the service sector, while they are absent from the construction sector. Finally, a signi…cant proportion of women works under a "public contract", the latter is typical in the service sector and is very similar to contractual agreements in the public sector.
Employer Size-Wage E¤ect
The starting point of the analysis is to test some …rst-order implications of the monopsony-search model. As anticipated in previous section, the …rst testable implication is that the employer size-wage e¤ect is, given …rm size, increasing in the level of pro…ts. That is to say, the size e¤ect is larger where the monopsony power is higher (Green et al., 1996) . So, it is necessary to identify groups of workers in the labour market that are supposed to be more likely to be characterised as monopsonistic and test if this turns out to be con…rmed in the data. I do this comparing men and women and try to look at the gender gap in this perspective.
The …rst thing I do is to regress the log of yearly wages against dummies for employment size, where the benchmark is the group 16-100. Results are reported in Table 2 . Note that men and women are almost equally distributed across …rm sizes. It is also no surprise to observe that many workers are employed at very small …rms as typical for the Italian economy. 12 Working in a …rm with more than 500 employees instead of working in a medium (16-99 employees) …rm gives a premium of more than 56% for men and around 39% for women. In columns (2) and (4), I add controls for age, number of weeks paid during the year, experience, tenure, sectorial dummies, regional dummies, type of bargaining agreement and year dummies. The reduction in coe¢ cients for the employer-size e¤ect indicates that part of that can be attributable to worker heterogeneity and composition effects. Still, the positive relation between paid wages and size is monotonic and also robust to the inclusion of further controls. There are some interesting di¤erences across men and women. The employer size-wage e¤ect estimated without controls is slightly higher for men; however, controlling for other characteristics, women are found to get higher premia for working in large …rms. This evidence suggests that the monopsony model can help to explain the gender wage di¤erential: given there are frictions in the market, an observed larger size e¤ects for women is what one should expect to …nd if the labour market is monopsonistic. 12 According to the ISTAT census …gures for 1996 as regards the distribution of …rms by number of employees, 95% of …rms have fewer than 9 employees, 3.2% between 10 and 19 employees, 1.3% between 20 and 49 employees, 0.4% between 50 and 249, and only 0.07% more than 250 employees. In 1996 the average number of employees per …rm was 3.9. In 1996, the ISTAT census showed that 47% of the labour force worked in …rms with fewer than 9 employees, 11% in …rms with between 10 and 19 employees, 10.1% in …rms with between 20 and 49 employees, 11.7% in …rms with between 50 and 249 employees, and 20.7% in …rms with more than 250 employees. Results above indicate that there is a statistical correlation between wages paid and employer size. However, many competing theories are able to explain this stylised fact. In what follows, I try to shed some light on these issues and try to …nd if the monopsony model is able to explain these regularities against some other model. One candidate alternative explanation is that workers could select themselves in high paying …rms. Workers'quality di¤ers across …rms, so both observable and unobservable characteristics could drive these spurious results. The most simple thing to do is to control for unobserved heterogeneity estimating a …xed e¤ects model in which I put on the right side the log of employment at the …rm, i.e., regress the change in log wages on the change in log employment. In the second step I also include more controls. Results for cross section elasticities and …xed e¤ects are reported in Table 3 .
Regression results indicate that heterogeneity is an important issue (as expected). Interestingly, …xed e¤ects estimates are substantially higher than standard cross sections, at least when not controlling for observable characteristics, this is true for both men and women. However, there is much more di¤erence for women, indicating unobserved heterogeneity can play di¤erent roles in wage determination. Adding controls to …xed e¤ects estimates substantially reduces the coe¢ cients, in this case the employer size e¤ect is about 3.5% for men and 2.6% for women. Finally, using the sample of movers, coe¢ cients are further reduced. These …gures point out that the employer size e¤ect could also be driven by unobserved quality and this should be considered when looking at the gender wage gap. Naturally, from these preliminary results, it is di¢ cult to discriminate between di¤erent theories. Another possible theoretical explanation is that the labour market is competitive and employer size di¤erentials are simply compensating di¤erentials. Working in large …rms can result in worse working conditions, that could be compensated by paying higher wages. To check this issue, I tabulate transition probabilities by …rm size. The main idea is that, if the employer size e¤ect is driven by compensating di¤erentials, workers should quit all …rms with the same probability. Results, not reported, show that male workers in very large establishments (more than 500 workers) are less likely to quit. Women show a constant separation rate. To further check this, I run a probit regression where the dependent variable is the probability of changing job on employer size and other variables.
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Some interesting results emerge from Table 4 . The probability of changing job is negatively related to previous employer size for both men and women indicating that workers are less likely to quit large …rms, contrary to what is predicted by the compensating wage di¤erential theory. Adding controls in column (2), the e¤ect is substantially reduced for men, while slightly increases for women (column 5) and they are substantially similar. Finally, controlling also for previous wages in third and sixth columns, the negative relation decreases in magnitude, i.e., workers in large establishments are less likely to quit. As expected, the coe¢ cient on the previous wage is negative. This indicates that, all else being equal, high wage workers are less likely to quit their jobs. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient for women is lower, indicating that probably their choice of moving is less related to money reasons.
One last possibility for the employer size-wage e¤ect to arise is that the labour market is not competitive but there are again asymmetric information and rents. The …rst possibility is that as …rms get larger, it is more di¢ cult to monitor workers and then it is necessary to pay them higher wages to deter them shirking (e¢ ciency wages). On the other hand, rent sharing would suggest that some …rms get high rents and share them with workers (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). If this is the case, I should expect to observe larger employer size e¤ect in sectors where there are more rents to share. Rent sharing would predict these rents are associated with union presence, as more organised workers are able to extract more rents. However, the absence of any information regarding pro…ts and rents in this data, the only possibility is to control for union and non-union sectors. If unions reduce rents, as predicted by the monopsony model, I should observe weaker employer size-wage e¤ect in sectors in which unions are stronger.
Unfortunately, I don't have such information and just look at employer sizewage e¤ect for eight di¤erent sectors while controlling for their unionisation (density) rate. Results are reported in Table 5 . I do …nd some minor di¤erences across sectors, with somewhat larger e¤ects for women in some industries. In particular, credit and service sectors have lower union density, and the size e¤ect is larger, as the monopsony model predicts. What is more, in the credit sector, the e¤ect is larger for women, as postulated by the theory. Note also size e¤ects are lower in strongly unionised sectors, as transport; with basically no di¤erences between men and women, as also found in the manufacturing sector.
To further investigate this issue, I try to look at di¤erent bargaining agreements. Clearly, I expect to …nd stronger e¤ects where unions are weaker, i.e., the employer e¤ect should be higher where there are more rents to share. 13 Firm level bargaining should result in higher e¤ects. Results are reported in Table 6 . It is de…nitely interesting what emerges from regressions strati…ed by contractual agreements. As expected, the employer size-wage e¤ect is larger at …rms that bargain wages in two steps, i.e., by adding a wage drift to the base national contractual wage. As predicted by the monopsony model, the e¤ect is higher where pro…ts are higher and there are more rents to share. Interestingly, women bene…t larger size e¤ects at those …rms. This contrast with the rent sharing hypothesis that predicts workers with more labour market attachment (men) should be able to extract more rents and show higher size e¤ects. Instead, stronger e¤ects for women could suggest the monopsony model can be used as a good benchmark to interpret these …ndings.
Reverse Regressions
Estimates of the labour supply elasticity to an individual …rm obtained by looking at the employer size wage e¤ect are simple to calculate. Cross section estimates indicate that " wL for men is about 0.034 and for women is about 0.043, after controlling for some observable characteristics. Using equation (3), these …gures suggest that the elasticity of labour supply " Lw = 1=" wL is in the region between In particular, it is relative variances and correlations of errors in the equations that seems to drive results. What is more, the latter seem to in ‡uence results in opposite directions depending on the method used to estimate the elasticity of labour supply, and further work is needed to better identify a precise estimate of labour supply elasticity. 16 To correctly estimate the labour supply elasticity, what is really needed is a shock to the marginal revenue product of labour that causes exogenous variation in wages without a¤ecting the labour supply. This calls for an instrumental variable estimation. Before turning to these issues, in next subsection I present estimates of labour supply elasticity from a dynamic model.
Wage Elasticities of Separations and Estimates from a Dynamic Model
The starting point of the analysis is the dynamic model of monopsony by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) presented in the theoretical section. In that context, the equilibrium level of employment L(w) is equal to the ratio of the ‡ow of recruits R(w) to the separation rate s(w). If one can estimate separately the wage elasticity of separations and recruits, then it is possible to get an estimate of the elasticity of labour supply to the wage as di¤erence between the two. The good news is that estimating the wage elasticity of separations is relatively simple, while it is more di¢ cult to estimate the wage elasticity of recruits. Following Manning (2003) , I showed the relation between the two elasticities and demonstrate (see equation (9) ) that in a steady state equilibrium, the following relation holds " sw = " Rw : The intuition behind this result is very simple: one separation corresponds to a recruit, conditional on the fact it is related to the wage. Note also that speci…cations above assume that separations to non-employment and recruitment from non-employment are not related to wages. Relaxing this assumption, the labour supply elasticity can be written as follows
where R is the share of recruits from employment and S is the share of separations to another job; in a steady state they are the same. In previous section, I showed that under certain conditions " e sw = " e Rw holds; while " n sw is easily estimated from separations to non-employment. For wage elasticity from non-employment things are more complicated. In this case, I use the formula below proposed by Manning (2003) 
where w is the coe¢ cient for the wage in a logit model where the dependent variable is the probability of job to job transition. The estimation strategy is the following. First, I estimate separation elasticities of wages " sw , i.e., the probability of job change on the overall sample; the probability of job to job on the sample of changers on the wage " e sw ; the probability of job to non-employment on the wage for the sample of changers " n sw . I do this in three steps, …rst only the log of wage is on the right hand side, then I add controls for age, experience, number of weeks paid during the year, occupation, sector, region, level of bargaining agreement. Finally I also control for tenure. I summarise my results in Table 8 .
Wage elasticities of separations are estimated between 0:51 and 0:15 with some di¤erences between men and women. Men have somewhat higher wage elasticities, indicating that separations are more related to money reasons, while for women …nancial reasons seem to be less important for the moving decision. Results indicate also that wage elasticities of separations to non employment are higher. Adding controls, the size of these elasticities declines substantially, especially for women. Including previous tenure controls further reduces the size of the coe¢ cients but not very much. 17 Then, I use the wage elasticity of separations to employment " e sw to recover the wage elasticity of recruits from employment " e Rw . The separation elasticity to non employment " n sw is estimated on the sample of changers for those that don't get a new job when moving. The elasticity of recruits from non-employment is estimated using the elasticity of recruits from employment and the adjustment described above using equation (13) . Results are as follows: for men (women), the proportion of jobs terminating into another job (when restricting the sample to workers with less than 24 months of non-employment) is equal to 0:56 (0:58), the coe¢ cient on log wage w without controls is 0:274 (0:250), while the coe¢ cient with controls is 0:184 (0:085). Finally, all wage elasticities and proportions of separations to employment and recruits from employment are used in equation (12) to calculate the elasticity of labour supply.
Results are reported in Table 9 . Again, the elasticity of labour supply is estimated low (around 0:4 for men and 0:3 for women), de…nitely lower than the one estimated before using reverse regression methods. The empirical model is able to show expected di¤erences between men and women with the latter having again lower elasticities. This again suggests that the monopsony model in its dynamic (oligopsonistic) version can help to explain the wage gender di¤erential. 17 Here I don't consider any endogeneity issue for tenure. 20 
Evidence from a "Natural" Experiment
Previous results indicate that estimating the labour supply elasticity is not a simple task because of endogeneity issues and the relative biases involved. Although some empirical predictions of the monopsony model are veri…ed in the data, with some success with respect to other di¤erent theories of wage determination, they are still not very clear-cut and further work is needed to identify the source of bias in standard OLS regressions. In principle, as Manning (2003) also suggests, what is really needed to correctly estimate the labour supply elasticity is a …rm level demand shock that doesn't a¤ect supply, so that exogenous shifts in demand trace out the supply curve. The instrument should have an impact on the particular …rm but not on the market as a whole, i.e., it shouldn't increase the overall level of wages and it should in ‡uence supply only indirectly through the wage. 18 One possibility is that of using exogenous variation in wages that is driven by institutional factors. This is the classic case in the natural experiment literature. However, these changes have an e¤ect on the population as a whole, so there is no control group to evaluate the e¤ects of this intervention. However, identi…cation is still possible by looking at di¤erent e¤ects of this change across di¤erent parts of the wage distribution or across di¤erent time periods. Institutional changes in Italian industrial relations and wage bargaining can play this role. Until 1992, an automatic indexation mechanism called Scala Mobile (SM) was protecting workers from loss in their purchasing power, i.e., adjusting wages to the cost of living. 19 After various changes in its structure, and many political and economic debates, the escalator clause has been eventually abandoned. Clearly, the SM had a substantial impact on the wage distribution. In particular, it had a di¤erent impact on men and women, a¤ecting the wage gap in di¤erent ways. Giving the same absolute wage increase to all workers, the SM had larger impact on women as their wages where lower and more likely to be observed at the bottom of the wage distribution (see Manacorda, 2004) . In other words, the SM was operating as a minimum wage.
In this context, the abolition of the SM, and the subsequent increase in the 18 Sullivan (1989) , Boal (1995) , Falch (2003) , Staiger et al. (2004) , and Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) are examples of applications of monopsony to di¤erent labour markets. The main idea of these studies is that of testing the theory using particular labour markets that can be considered as very close to the ideal textbook model of monopsony. Main empirical applications are referred to nurses, school teachers, workers in the coal mining sector. Most of them use natural experiments and IV estimates to identify the e¤ects they want to study. Fakhfakh and Fitzroy (2006) use …rm data to test the monopsony model providing evidence of strong size e¤ects and positive e¤ects of employment expansion on wages.
19 See Erickson and Ichino (1995) for a …rst evaluation of the e¤ects of SM on gender di¤erentials in the 1970s and 1980s and Manacorda (2004) for a recent application to analyse fall and rise in wage inequality in Italy.
relative wage di¤erential between men and women, should have an impact on relative employment. If labour markets are competitive, then increases in the relative wage di¤erential in favor of men should determine an increase in the relative employment of women (demand side e¤ect). 20 However, if the labour market is monopsonistic, the increase in relative wages can have a positive e¤ect on relative employment of men, the reason being that the labour supply to the individual …rm is positively sloped. Of course, I also need to control for relative changes in the composition of skills in the workforce and its relative shifts that can in ‡uence the gender and employment di¤erential. In particular, educational attainment can be controlled using the composition of the workforce in terms of skills. In this case, age composition is not very important as I am using a sample of very young workers. 21 The exercise proceeds as follows: …rst, I calculate relative wages of men and women at each …rm for the years 1985, 1990, 1992 and 1996 . Second, for each establishment, I derive the proportion of men and women as represented in the sample of workers, and multiply this percentage by the number of workers currently employed at the …rm, obtaining the (predicted) number of men and women employed. This allows me to calculate relative employment at each …rm, so that I have information on the percentage di¤erence in wages and employment between men and women. The two subperiods are 1991-1985 (before) and 1996-1992 (after).
The …rst step in the analysis is to check the following relationship
where " is the error term, t = 1991; 1996 and t 5 = 1985; 1992 respectively. Equation (14) simply says that the evolution of the relative wage di¤erential should be correlated with the initial relative wage di¤erential. I expect that for …rms with higher gender wage gap at the beginning of the period, this will be reduced over time. If the hypothesis of di¤erent market mechanisms at work in the two periods is true, I expect in the second period a smaller coe¢ cient. The reason is that, in the …rst period, strong collective bargaining agreements had stronger impact on the reduction of the di¤erential because SM was sustaining wages at the bottom of the wage distribution. After the abolition of the SM, initial wage di¤erentials are still negatively related to changes in the di¤erentials, but market forces should (2) OLS ( reduce the coe¢ cient. Results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 con…rm this intuition.
The second regression to be estimated reads as follows
where X is a set of controls de…ned below. Again, equation (15) has to be estimated for both periods, before and after the abolition of SM. In this case, it is also important to control for relative demand shifts that could in ‡uence relative employment of men and women. For this reason, I include relative changes in the percentage of white collars against blue collars as a proxy for the relative change in skills at each …rm. 22 Before the abolition of SM, relative wage changes were mostly driven by institutional factors, hence, when estimating equation (15) , I should observe a strong negative relation between changes in relative employment and changes in relative wages (employment is determined by labour demand). On the other hand, if the market is monopsonistic, after the abolition of the SM, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient should be reduced. In other words, the abolition of SM could provide a test for discriminating between the monopsony model and the competitive (or union) model. 23 Main results of the analysis are summarised in Table 10 , columns (3) and (4).
As already noted, changes in relative wages of men are strongly negatively correlated with the relative wage di¤erential at the beginning of each period. Although the statistical signi…cance of the exercise is very low; interestingly, there is a strong negative relationship between changes in relative employment and relative wages of men in the …rst period. As expected, when …rms choose the optimal combination of workers to employ, they choose to hire less men as their wages are higher. This indicates that …rms are on their demand curve, no matter if the "correct"model is the competitive or the right-to-manage model with unions. However, after the abolition of the SM, the relationship between relative employment and wages turns out to be positive, even again it is important to stress this is not statistically signi…cant. This is exactly what in principle is predicted by the monopsony model. 24 Finally, in the last two columns of Table 10 , I report results for IV estimates. I instrument the relative wage change with relative wage at the beginning of the period. Using IV, evidence of a negative relation between relative wage and employment changes emerges in both periods. However, results are inconclusive and the overall statistical signi…cance of this exercise is very weak. I now turn to comparison of these results for the estimation of labour supply elasticity and to results obtained in the literature.
Overall results are in line with those obtained by Manning (2003) for the UK using the BHPS. 25 Results are consistent with expectations in terms of magnitude of coe¢ cients. First, both studies …nd that estimates of the labour supply elasticity using employer size wage e¤ects are quite high; as expected the e¤ect is larger in Britain, where decentralised bargaining and less unionised labour market can drive this result. His estimate of the employer size-wage is equal to 0.06 for the whole sample in the UK against 0.03 for women and 0.04 for men in my study. Again, results from reverse regressions, indicate that there is a substantial gap between wages paid and marginal product, this gap is lower in the UK, as predicted by the monopsony model. Estimates of the labour supply elasticity are 0.37 for Great Britain against an average of about 0.30 for Italy. In addition, the elasticity of labour supply obtained using dynamic models is estimated close to 0.7 for the UK against 0.4 and 0.3 for Italy. Interestingly, comparison of results also indicates that the direction of di¤erent biases goes in the same direction, indicating that further research is needed to give a better estimate of the elasticity of labour supply. 24 Remember that in equation (15) I also control for relative skill composition of workers by adding on the right hand side the di¤erence in percentage of white collars and blue collars employees at that …rm in di¤erent periods. This should proxy for relative demand shocks in employment and technological progress. 25 See Tables 4.5 and 4.10 in his study.
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In this paper, I study gender wage di¤erentials using the static classic model of monopsony and the dynamic Burdett and Mortensen (1998) equilibrium search model with frictions. In particular, I exploit equilibrium relations and empirical implications of the theoretical models in terms of ‡ows and distributions to analyse the dynamics of gender wage di¤erentials in Italy. I provide di¤erent estimates of the labour supply elasticity facing an individual employer to prove …rm can wage discriminate and pay lower wages to women. I also exploit a "natural"experiment (the abolition of a wage indexation mechanism that took place in Italy in 1991) to test the monopsony model against other models of wage determination. Given a labour supply curve to the …rm not perfectly elastic as it is assumed in the competitive labour market, …rms can wage discriminate between men and women because the two groups have di¤erent labour supply elasticities. There are many reasons for this di¤erential outcomes between men and women, these are mirrored in structural transition parameters of the equilibrium model. Some possible explanations for di¤erent turnover behaviour of men and women are in di¤erent levels of search frictions they face.
Results indicate that women have somewhat larger bene…ts from working at bigger …rms and consequently lower labour supply elasticity, as predicted by the monopsony model. Employer size e¤ects by sector of activity indicate that larger e¤ects (especially for women) are in less unionised sectors, where bargaining agreements give employers the possibility of negotiating part of the compensation package directly with workers. The labour supply elasticity calculated by looking at the employer size e¤ect is quite high, but still far from the perfectly competitive approximation. An estimate of the labour supply elasticity calculated using separation functions and the dynamic structure of the monopsony model give quite lower values for this elasticity, especially for women. Finally, the institutional change in wage indexation mechanism at work in Italy (abolition of Scala Mobile) shows a positive correlation between the relative changes in male/female employment and relative changes in the gender wage di¤erential, even if the statistical signi…cance of the exercise is weak. I interpret this qualitative results in favor of the monopsony model against the labour demand model (with unions), that seemed a good theoretical benchmark for the period before the reform.
The aim of this paper was to try to shed some light on the capacity of a monopsony model to interpret some stylised facts we observe in the labour market data. Despite Italian's labour market is often considered as strongly centralised with powerful unions, the empirical evidence o¤ered in this paper shows that is not the whole story and that changes in the institutional framework give employers some monopsony power. Recognising this fact, helps to better understand the workings of the labour market and to improve policy prescriptions.
